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The Horthy regime's first bitter pill was the 175
Versailles-Trianon Peace Treaty which mutilated Hungary: 71 per 728
cent of her pre-war territories and 63 per cent of her inhabitants were given to the new neighbors: Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

This Treaty, so contrary to the Wilsonian ideals, kept burning the flame of irredenta among the Magyars without distinction of class. The national grievances resulting from the Treaty of Trianon were one of the most important reasons why certain anti-western and pro-German propaganda found ready response among a large number of the people.

In 1920, 54.2 per cent of the land belonged to big landowners in 175
estates over 100 hold, i.e. 142 acres. In order to solve this urgent problem 423
of the rural population, an agrarian reform of limited scope was initiated to remedy the historic injustice. However, only 26 per cent of the large estates were concerned; 404,000 peasants received only a little over four acres each. The reform, with its weak aims and the paternal enforcement methods which it employed, failed to impress the peasantry.

With a vivid picture of Communist terror in their memory, and 175
suffering from an ever-increasing pressure from the expanding Reich, the Hungarians drifted closer and closer to the Axis side. Then came their participation in World War II on the side of the Germans, defeat, and the final occupation of the country by the Red Army in 1945.

563 The only appreciable minorities in Hungary are the Germans
162 and the Slovaks, but even their number is almost negligible: at present, 2 per cent of the population is German and 0.1 per cent Slovak. The attitude of these minorities toward the present government is quite different: the Slovaks have never had any reason for harboring special resentment against the Communist regime, for they have not been subjected, as have the ~~Slovaks~~ GERMANS, to any discriminatory treatment on the part of the government. Their attitude resembles, therefore, that of the Magyars with whom they live in mixed settlements. The Germans, on the other hand, have been treated with special harshness by the present regime. The German-speaking inhabitants before the war comprised 5.1 per cent of the country's inhabitants, but only 3.3 per cent of the population registered in 1941 as belongin
728 to German nationality. After World War II, the Potsdam treaty stipu-
563 lated that "the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken." This agreement referred only to the "disloyal" elements, but no one ever established a workable standard for selecting such people, and thus the fate of hundreds of thousands of Hungarians of German origin were in the hands of local, mostly Communist,

728 563 authorities. The post-war government undertook immediately to comply with the Potsdam decisions and to transfer Germans back to Germany. The Communists, who were strongly represented in the local and later the central government, were ruthless in the evacuation procedure. Deportees were often deprived of the most meager personal belongings and were pushed, helpless, over the border; cases of atrocities were also reported. Those who did manage to remain on their farms (most of the Germans affected were farmers) have not forgotten the lot of their neighbors and relatives, and they are now fiercely anti-Communist, although the government is making some efforts to win them over through German-speaking party organizers and propagandists and by means of a limited-circulation weekly published in German.

186 The national symbols of the Magyars originate, without exception, in pre-Communist times. There is no evidence as yet of any newly-introduced Communist symbol (the Red Star or the like) having gained popular acceptance. Two of the former national symbols, the royal crown and the national coat of arms, have been banned. Although there is no mention of them nowadays, the people who are now (1955) twenty or over, have been brought up on the assumption that the "Holy Crown" embodies national unity and independence and

delegation whip in hand, and was very rude to them. . . .000
No, our lords were never very good so far as foresight is concerned.
You know about President Wilson's note in January 1918.728
Among the Fourteen Points one said:

> "The people of Austro-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development."

President Wilson's note came on January 8th. At that time the Allies were still fighting. As we see it, President Wilson made this offer thinking that the Austrian and Hungarian lords already knew that the war was lost, but that if they were willing, by concluding a separate peace, to risk a little in order to make it shorter, a lot of bloodshed might be avoided. The war might be shortened by many months.

We wanted to accept the offer. All our leaders wanted to accept it. Count Michael Károlyi wanted to accept it. He even made public a declaration in favour of acceptance.

Our lords, Counts Tisza, Andrássy, Bethlen and the rest, advised the young king not to pay any attention to it. They called everybody a traitor who wanted to accept it.

The very same lords were prepared to accept it and to conclude a separate peace on the very same terms on October 18th 1918, nearly ten months later. But then it was too late. The Czechs and the Serbs did contribute to the Allied cause: the Czecho-slovak National Council was acknowledged by the Allies.

Our lords lost the game—not only their game, but also Hungary's.

At the end of September 1918 Allied troops broke through the Bulgarian front. The Hungarian Premier was at that time an old reactionary called Wekerle. Some journalists visited him. He told them:

"I have, *of course*, known for a long time that the war was lost, but *of course* we could not do a thing, because of the Germans."

"But why didn't we make a separate peace?" one of those present asked.

"The terms were not good enough."

As for the Bulgarian collapse, he said that this would be "awkward" for the other ally of Germany—Turkey. In order to ensure that Turkey did not conclude a separate peace, we must send Hungarian troops there.

"What's the use of that?" a journalist asked.

"Nothing much; chiefly political. The Germans want it. We won't see many of those poor chaps again."

●728 But "those poor chaps" were sent and promptly got killed, like so many million other poor chaps, because these foolish gentlemen still refused to learn how to think.

728 On October 8th the Social Democratic Party demanded in a
668 declaration the immediate formation of a democratic government. This government, they said, must conclude a separate peace at once on the basis of Wilson's Points.

The declaration drew a true picture of Hungary's situation. For four years the people had fought for German Imperialism. The war would soon be lost. As yet there were no foreign troops on Hungarian territory. But there would be. The Hungarian people, who had been forced into this war against their will, would certainly be punished for the sins of their rulers. "The representatives of the feudal classes are still clinging to their power. We point to the hundreds of internal and external wounds of the country and tell you: This is what you have done. This is your work; yours is the responsibility."

Our lords still did not believe that the end had come. They told each other in their aristocratic clubs that the British would never let the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy collapse, just as in 1942 they told each other that the British would never permit the Russians to bomb Budapest. They thought they knew the British. After all, they had hunted with the British.

On October 17th 1918, Charles IV asked his good Austrian subjects "to form national councils for the creation of a federated State. Each nationality can form its own State autonomy."

What did the Hungarian lords do? Were they glad that independence was here at last? Oh no. *They forced the Emperor to exempt Hungary from this.* The Hungarian Premier threatened the Emperor that he would not send food to Austria if the Emperor did not add a point to this declaration stating that the integral nature of Hungary must be preserved. This is to say that the people living under the Austrian lords were given the chance to be free, but the people living under Hungarian lords were not.

Even so, the good lords were terribly worried. Their whole world collapsed when they saw that the Habsburg Kaiser was for Hungarian independence and against them. How could they call all the politicians who wanted independence traitors if even the Emperor proclaimed that Hungary might be separated from Austria?

Next day in the Hungarian Parliament the Opposition declared itself in favour of an independent Hungarian Government, a separate Hungarian Foreign Office, and peace. The big leaders of the "countocracy"—Tisza, Andrássy and the rest—protested against

2:Paloczy-Horvath H-3 (no date)1944 EC1 Hungary EC1

this. Prince Windischgraetz screamed at them: "You traitors! We will be loyal to our German Allies to the grave." (Meaning, of course, that *we*, the people, should die for the Germans.) The counts applauded. A few weeks later the very same counts who had said that being pro-Ally was treason all criticised *our* leaders for not being pro-Entente enough, and when the Allied missions arrived in Budapest it turned out that they had always hated the Germans and loved the British and the French.

Yes, they were the last to see what was coming, but when it came they had no scruples about going over from friend to foe. Count Andrássy, the famous "black Count", who was hated by the people and was leader of the reactionary aristocracy (just as Count Stephen Bethlen is leader of the countocracy today)—this "black Count Andrássy" was still a staunch supporter of the German cause on October 14th 1918.

Although the Kaiser gave Hungary independence, he insisted that she should have no separate Foreign Secretary. He won his case, and Andrássy became Foreign Secretary for both Austria and Hungary. In this capacity he promised full support to the Germans. Eleven days later he offered a separate peace. But those eleven days cost Hungary a lot.

On October 25th we elected a democratic National Council, headed by Michael Károlyi, to democratise Hungary and conclude peace. The lords still played their game of politics. A new reactionary count became premier.

On October 29th a great multitude of us wanted to go to the Royal Palace and demand that the king's deputy, Archduke Joseph, should make Károlyi premier. One of our leaders telephoned to the Archduke informing him of our intention and promising that we would "behave". The Archduke had a conference with his counts. When we arrived at the Danube bridge —a peaceful crowd, completely unarmed—three infantry companies blocked the way. We called to them to join our side, that we meant no harm. They promptly joined us, though the officers wanted them to shoot at us.

Then we tried to go on. But behind the military stood the police. They—without warning—immediately fired at us and then charged us with drawn swords. Many of us were killed, more than a hundred wounded. *We did not kill anybody.*

Then we grew angry. Together—soldiers and workers—we occupied the important public buildings. There was no resistance. The representatives of the police came to our National Council, begging our pardon, protesting that orders were orders and offering to join our council.

668 THIS WAS OUR REVOLUTION.

728 WE WERE FIRED AT. WE DID NOT HAVE TO USE ARMS.

Our revolution succeeded without bloodshed, just as in 1848. And, just as in 1848, so also in 1918 our cynical and clever lords managed to defeat our revolution, putting the chains of slavery on us again. In November 1919 the same old gang of counts and county gentlemen ground us into the earth, and they are doing so up to this very day.

At that time we did not know this. We only knew that the hated Habsburg Empire had at last collapsed. After four hundred years of Habsburg oppression we were—so we thought—finally free.

000 Naturally we did not behave like little lambs. We were drunk with happiness because peace had come. We were drunk with hatred of our officers. We wanted to have our revenge on those leaders who had forced us into the four years' slaughter, we wanted to pay back some of the cruel officers who had treated us like beasts. We wanted land and work. We wanted to get even with the profiteers who had palmed off on us paper-soled boots for us to freeze in. And above all we wanted to get home as quickly as possible. Nobody could hold us back. From every direction we streamed into Budapest and the other cities—from the Italian front, from the Eastern front, from everywhere. We crowded the trains; we crowded the roofs of the carriages. Hundreds of us were killed as the bridges knocked us off the tops of the trains. Our mood was dangerous. We tore off the insignia from the collars of our officers. We got used to killing. We had had four years' schooling in it. But we committed only one murder.

We murdered Count Stephen Tisza, the great reactionary lord whom we held responsible for the war. Later on our lords accused some politicians and journalists of the murder of Count Tisza. Their innocence was established. No, we, the "unknown soldiers", killed Tisza. *We* are prepared to take full responsibility for this murder. Is it only our lords who have the right to send us to be slaughtered by the hundred thousand in their interests, while we have no right to revenge? No, sir.

We were in a bad mood. Four years of hell did not make angels out of us. The streets of Budapest were full of us, ragged soldiers, poor comrades twitching with shell-shock, soldiers, soldiers who were lean and fierce, like wolves.

668 There was a tremendous muddle in Budapest and the country. In Budapest alone more than three hundred thousand of us were waiting to be demobilised, to be sent home. We got roaring drunk if we had the chance. We attacked officers and gentlemen.

668 denounced the Karolyi Government to the foreign Allied missions
423 in Budapest as Bolshevik. In this way they achieved two results. Result number one was that the Allied missions turned against the man who was loyal to the idea of peace all through the war, who was against Germany all through the war. The Allied missions and Governments allowed the Rumanian, Czech and Serb forces —even after the armistice was signed—considerably to extend their occupation of purely Hungarian territories. Result number two was that in default of Allied aid the Károlyi Government was defeated by the Communists. The great lords, all the aristocrats, were very happy the day Communism was proclaimed in Hungary. They feared that the Allies might discover that Károlyi's Government was democratic, that they would help Károlyi, and that democracy would then be established in Hungary. If there were real, out-and-out Communists ruling Hungary—so the lords hoped—it would be easier to get help from the Allies against the Communists, who would be beaten. Then they could return and get back their land. The calculations of these lords, led by Count Stephen Bethlen, were right.

CHAPTER X

●728 In 1919 the Károlyi Government went to pieces because of
648 the blind stubbornness of the French commander at Belgrade,
669 Franchet D'Esperay, who snubbed and humiliated the Hungarian Government—which had, after all, overthrown the war-time administration and was democratic and anti-German. At last the Károlyi Government's position became impossible. Some of the great lords, who had influence over Franchet D'Esperay, saw with pleasure that the people's Hungary—the Hungary of Károlyi and of the Communists—was left by this extreme reactionary French general to the mercies of her neighbours. They knew that the people's Hungary would in this way be defeated. The "Red" scare of the Allies was exploited by all our enemies.

On March 20th 1919, a French lieut.-colonel, a certain Vyx, handed the Károlyi Government a new order of the Allies demanding that Hungary should accept a fresh line of demarcation. Some month previously Hungary had already signed an armistice with the Allies in Belgrade. This was severe enough, cutting deeply into territories inhabited by Hungarians. Now the Allies—determined to make "Red" Hungary as small as possible—presented a new demand in the form of a fresh line of demarcation

2:Paloczy-Horvath H-3 (no date)1944 EC1 Hungary EC1

728 which would have given our neighbours a further two million
648 Hungarians. The Károlyi Government wanted to hold a
669 plebiscite. They wanted to ask us "What do we want? To give in to this outrage or fight on?" The Allies did not give Károlyi time for this. They demanded an answer by next day.

Károlyi did not want to take the responsibility, and he resigned. We think he was right. You see, in our eyes he represented the Western democracies and the principles of Wilson. We knew that during the four years of war he was on the side of the British, the French and the Americans. We knew that he was always anti-German and for a separate peace. Well, we thought, if the Allies treat this man like dirt, then there is nothing to hope for from the Western democracies; our only hope is Soviet Russia.

Already the Communists were very active. A great part of the Socialist Party went over to them. The country needed a united army. The Communists were able to organise it. Károlyi trusted the West. He failed. We did not blame him, but it was only right that he should take the consequences of his pro-Western policy. *We wanted now to try the ways of the East.*

The Hungarian Soviet Republic was born on March 21st 1919, thanks to the Vyx ultimatum. The president of the Hungarian Soviet Council said on that day:

"The Entente-Imperialism used democracy and the self-determination of peoples as its flag, but now, when all these principles could be realised, other ways are chosen. . . . The whole world must see that in these new territories all the food supplies will be in the power of the Entente and hundreds of thousands more refugees will flood Hungary. . . . We were convinced that the Entente wanted to conclude a just peace. But the Vyx ultimatum makes our conviction ridiculous. . . . We cannot expect anything from the West but a dictated peace. The new policy means that we want to get what we want from the East instead of the West: justice. . . . If we are to sum up impartially, we must say that everything which is happening now is doing so because the Entente forced this development."

Two days later, when Béla Kún, president of the Hungarian Soviets, broadcast a declaration to the proletariat of the world, he said:

"The ultimatum of the Entente aimed at handing over Hungary at once to the Rumanian oligarchy. The Hungarian people answered this ultimatum by the creation of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The Hungarian red armies fought against heavy odds. Franchet D'Esperay, the French General who had collaborated with the

728 669 648 counter-revolutionary government in Szeged, did everything he could to starve out Hungary. Food trains were stopped. The Czechs fought the red army in the north. They came quite near to Budapest and then were driven back.

Meanwhile the French right wing helped to crush democracy after the real danger, Prussian and Habsburg Imperialism, was beaten.

When Bolshevism broke out in Hungary, Benes of the Czechs, in his articles in the *Matin* and *Times*, and in his representations to the Supreme Council, supplemented the argument previously put forward by the plea that "the interest of Europe demanded that the northern part of Hungary should be given to the Czechs".

The Communist Government had to organise a red army speedily to defend Hungarian territories. Once again the world was able to watch the not very unique spectacle of "nationalist" lords, white officers, helping the enemy (Rumanian) armies which were attacking their own country. The Hungarian red army fought the Czechs and the Rumanians. *White officers sent by the counter-revolutionary government directed the Rumanian guns against Hungarians defending their territory.*

669 423 The Communist Government of Béla Kun had no time to carry through the land reform either. They declared all land exceeding a hundred acres State property without compensation. The small and medium holdings with farm or house were to remain untouched. The expropriated land the Communists wanted to turn into co-operatives, into *kolkhozes*. In most cases the expropriated landlords were asked for the time being to administer their own properties. Thus they had the nice job of guarding them for themselves.

669 648 In the summer of 1919 the Rumanians resumed their advance and occupied Budapest. G. D. H. Cole writes:

> "In November the Rumanians withdrew from Budapest after doing a great deal of damage, and took with them in their withdrawal as much of the movable property and instruments of production of the Hungarians as they were able to lay hands upon. . . . "

It was curious to watch how our lords behaved towards the Rumanians. When the Károlyi Government wanted to establish peaceful relations with all Hungary's neighbours, they started wild anti-Rumanian propaganda to make Károlyi's work more difficult. When it turned out that Károlyi really meant to distribute the land, and during the Communist regime, they suddenly discovered the solidarity of interest between Rumania

and Hungary. *At this time the Hungarian red army was defending Hungary against the Rumanians.* Our lords informed the Allied commanders that they thought it was in the interests of the country for Rumania to occupy Hungary. 669 648

The minute the Rumanians occupied Budapest all the counts, bankers and landowners returned to the capital and started to prepare the way for the counter-revolution. The white army of Admiral Horthy was waiting impatiently in the South Hungarian city of Szeged.

The diplomatic representative and commissioner of the Entente was a certain Sir George Clerk. Sir George at first negotiated with democratic politicians too, but later got to know our polite, charming and well-mannered counts. Eventually, a coalition government was formed which was sure to sign the peace treaty and give way to an out-and-out reactionary régime. After this, it was arranged that the Rumanian armies should leave Hungary.

Then the white troops of the counter-revolution entered the country of our lords, or what was left of it. The feudal lords came back with all their gendarmes and police spies. 669 648

We have told you pretty bad things about ourselves. You must not take it to heart if we tell you that *the Western Democracies thus helped back to power that very same reactionary and anti-democratic régime against which they said they were fighting.* 728

Your slogan was to make the world safe for democracy. As far as we are concerned YOU MADE HUNGARY SAFE FOR FEUDALISM.

You know, we do not generally use big and learned words about ourselves. If anything, we are realists. We either have the land or we have not. We are either beaten by the gendarmes or not. Our children either die of tuberculosis and starvation or not. You must not blame us, please, if we doubted for some time the sincerity of the great Western democracies. But facts—facts felt bitterly and directly by us—yes, these facts seemed to show that you were on the side of counter-revolution and feudalism.

Then President Wilson and others said that you were fighting for the self-determination of nations. What did we see? By the peace treaty of Trianon you put four million of us—without any plebiscite—in foreign territories. (Some people do not agree as to the numbers. But we have never heard from any authoritative British, American or French source a lower figure than 3,300,000 Hungarians placed under Rumanian, Czech and Serb rule.)

You said that you disliked composite states such as the Habsburg

669 Empire. Austria was cut to pieces because "a single state tyran
728 nising over a number of nations could not be tolerated in Europe".
648 But facts seemed to show that you created three Austrias in the place of one; a Czechoslovakia of Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Magyars, Germans and Ruthenians; a Rumania of Rumanians, Magyars, Germans, Serbs, Bulgarians, Turks, Tartars and Gipsies; a Yugoslavia of Serbs, Magyars, Bosnians, Croats, Slovenes, Turks, Montenegrins, Vends, Rumanians, Albanians, Italians and Macedonian Greeks.

669 Well, the counter-revolutionaries of Szeged, all the big feudal
661 lords and the white army, with beautiful white feathers in their caps, came to small, dismembered Hungary. The white terror began. Whereas during the revolutionary period, after the four years of slaughtering, less than a thousand people were killed, during the law-and-order period of the counter-revolution several thousands of us were tortured to death, Jewish men and women were tortured and killed, everyone who had a part in the revolutions was imprisoned or shot—mostly the latter—and those Socialist leaders who could not be accused of anything were just assassinated.

We know that the British *people* were revolted by the white terror of the country of our lords. In protest against the massacre of our leaders, the Labour and Socialist International attempted in June 1920 to organise an international boycott of Hungary. They did not succeed.

Too many people, all over the world, detest the word "revolution". *We dislike the counter-revolutionaries.* In our history the revolutionaries like Dózsa and his people defended Hungary, and the counter-revolutionaries who tortured him to death sold the country to the Turks. The *Kuruc* of Rákóczi were the revolutionaries, and the big lords who betrayed the country to the Habsburgs were the counter-revolutionaries.

Petöfi and Kossuth were fighting for Hungarian independence. They were revolutionaries. The Habsburg-collaborationist lords were the counter-revolutionaries.

Jesus was a revolutionary. Caiaphas and Pilate were the counter-revolutionaries.

Those who are on the side of the Hungarian people, who want to fight for our health and happiness, cannot have anything to do with the present régime, which has as "moral capital" the counter-revolution of Szeged and the white terror. These gentlemen who protest so much about their nationalism are suitable partners of Hitler and Mussolini, those two counter-revolutionary

2:Paloczy-Horvath H-3 (no date)1944 EC1 Hungary EC1

to call all sorts of workers "comrades". Our lords judged the revolutionaries chiefly by their appearance and smell. They also accused them of clumsiness: that they did not serve the interests of the country well, by drawing up the terrible Trianon peace treaty.

Is it necessary to point out that the war of 1914–18 was not started by the revolutionaries? The want and privation in Hungary were not caused by the revolution, but by the lost war. The whole continent suffered because after four years of mass-slaughter it took nearly two years before the supply of food in Europe could be organised.

For Trianon, for dismembering Hungary, not we but the counter-revolutionaries are responsible. Between 1908 and 1914 it was the counter-revolution that hindered the formation of the people's system of representation. This system would perhaps have prevented our entering the First Great War. After the lost war the counter-revolution, in its fear of land reform and blind hatred of the people, associated itself with the reactionary French general and the Rumanians to defeat the Hungarian Republic, and did not care that the price was the further dismembering of the country. Then for a period of twenty years this same dismemberment was exploited by them to keep awake a blind chauvinism, to distract our attention from our appalling social conditions by pointing at our neighbours and saying, "You would have land, you would have a better life, if they had not taken away large pieces of our territory."

CHAPTER XI

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On March 1st the National Assembly—elected in a White Terror atmosphere—made the Commander-in-Chief of the counter-revolutionary troops, the former Habsburg Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Regent of Hungary. Act 1 of 1920 "decreed the suspension of royal power and established a regency for a transitional period while maintaining the institution of a kingdom". From this time onward the world press often made fun of the kingless kingdom ruled over by an Admiral without a fleet.

This counter-revolutionary régime nevertheless had the same difficulties with the Entente as the Communists had had. The Paris Supreme Council sent an ultimatum demanding the signing of the proposed peace treaty. If Hungary refused to accept the terms there would be a fresh blockade.

The people's Hungary did not give in to such threats; the lords' Hungary did. It is true that the Hungarian Government received a covering letter signed by Millerand which stated that

> "later on, when the Boundary Commissions have begun their work, should they be of opinion that the provisions of the Treaty are unjust in character and that the remedying of this injustice is in the general interest, they will be in a position to report such opinion to the Council of the League of Nations. The Allied and Associated Powers agree that in such cases, provided a request to that effect be made by one of the interested parties, the Council of the League shall be entitled to offer its good services for the purpose of changing the original frontier by peaceful means."

This covering letter was dated May 6th 1920. On June 4th 1920 the Hungarian Delegates signed the Treaty of Trianon. Eighteen days later, on June 22nd 1920, the Council of Ambassadors gave the Boundary Commissions instructions contradictory to the promises contained in the letter, strictly forbidding those Commissions to take into consideration any racial, religious or economic interests rendering necessary even the slightest change of the frontiers fixed in the treaty.

We have already spoken about the responsibility of governments and that of peoples. We have pointed out that for the lost war and for the dismemberment of our country our lords are responsible *to us*.

But not so much to *you*.

Do not forget what your official investigators found concerning the war guilt in 1914–18.

So we must be fair, and say that when the peace conference forced the reactionary Horthy régime to sign the Trianon Peace Treaty in 1920 it committed a gross injustice.

Hungary lost 72% of her territory. Germany—who according to you bore the chief guilt—lost only 10%.

Hungary lost 64% of her inhabitants, Germany less than 10%.

Hungary lost 32% of pure Hungarians, Germany only 8% of Germans.

Rumania was given 110,000 square kilometres of Hungary and Hungary was left with 93,000 square kilometres.

G. D. H. Cole wrote in 1933:

> "Any map showing the political and ethnical divisions of post-War Europe will reveal that only on the West do the territorial frontiers of post-War Hungary coincide with the

frontier drawn according to ethnical divisions. All along the north there is a long stretch of territory with a Magyar majority that has been assigned to Czechoslovakia; down most of the eastern frontier there is a similar stretch of territory assigned to Rumania; in the south large bodies of Magyars are now under Yugoslav rule, and finally in Central Transylvania . . . there are considerable enclaves of Magyar population under Rumanian rule. . . . It is inevitable that Hungary should look covetously across her restricted frontiers to the immediately contiguous territories in which Magyar populations predominate."

If you want to understand the present and see something of the future, we must make you acquainted with these facts. We have given you ample proof that we do not love our lords. *But in wanting to get back those parts of the country where nearly one-third of the total number of Magyars lived—in this we always were united.* Our lords wanted St. Stephen's Hungary. We wanted Hungarian Hungary. That was the difference.

And the Hungary of our lords went year after year to the "law-court of the democracies", the League of Nations, and presented her case, pointed to the injustice and asked for peaceful revision. But nothing happened. And when the same Rumania which had been given a far bigger territory by the Allies than that which was left for Hungary, when this well-rewarded Rumania turned against her former Allies, she wasn't considered such a "bad boy" by the Allied press as the Hungary of our lords, which went over to Hitler's side, certainly much against the will of her population.

Do not forget, please, that we are talking about the *countries of lords*. We are talking of the Hungarian nation (that is, the Hungarian ruling class) as compared with the Rumanian nation (that is, the Rumanian ruling class). We do not mean that the Rumanian people are bad or that they are responsible for the policy of their lords.

We like the Rumanians, and we know that they hate Nazi-Fascist oppression just as much as we do. But if you judge governments and *not peoples*, it seems to us unjust to think the Hungarian lords worse than the Rumanian lords, who treacherously turned against their former Allies and forced hundreds of thousands of good simple Rumanians to be slaughtered in fighting against the good simple Russians.

We do not want to say too much of the 1920–1939 period, the period of the Horthy–Bethlen régime. Hungary was "con-

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Frontier changes, 1919–1941

P.10

9: Eppstein S-4 (no date) 1945 EC1 Hungary EC1

9: Eppstein S-4 (no date) 1945 EC1 Hungary EC1

in Austria, as the only racial element in that country which did not threaten Hungary's territorial integrity; for the Germans of Austria did not interest themselves particularly in Hungary's German population.

THE BOND WITH AUSTRIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Although, therefore, in 1914 the leaders of Hungary genuinely did not want the war, self-preservation prohibited them from leaving Austria and Germany in the lurch, even if they had been able to determine their own foreign policy, which was not the case. Thus in 1918 they were inevitably left, with the Germans of Austria, as the defeated enemy, while the other nations of the Monarchy gained their independence at the hands of the Allies, forming, largely at the expense of Hungary, the new States of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the greatly enlarged State of Rumania.

It is true that Austria also received some German-inhabited districts in West Hungary, the Burgenland, but although Hungary bitterly resented Austria's action in claiming these districts, as treachery to her old partner, they were insignificant compared to what was lost to the other States. Moreover, there were only a few thousand Magyars in the Burgenland, while Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia each received, not only the districts in which Slavs or Rumanians, as the case might be, were in the majority, but also considerable districts inhabited by Magyars. Some of these, as parts of Transylvania, could not be left with Hungary without leaving a larger number of non-Magyars in that country. Other districts lay right

9: Eppstein S-4 (no date) 1945 EC1 Hungary EC1

on the frontiers, but were taken from Hungary, in spite of their populations, for economic or strategic reasons. In this way Rumania got, in round figures and according to the Hungarian census of 1910,[1] 1,700,000 Magyars, together with 2,800,000 Rumanians and 750,000 other nationalities; Czechoslovakia 1,050,000 Magyars, with 1,690,000 Slovaks, 420,000 Ruthenes and 325,000 others; and Yugoslavia (excluding Croatia, the cession of which Hungary recognized) 470,000 Magyars with 605,000 Serbs, Croats and other Yugoslavs, and 450,000 others.

THE POLICY OF REVISION. From the day on which the Hungarian delegates signed the Treaty of Trianon, the whole of Hungarian foreign policy could be summed up in the single word 'revision'—revision of the Treaty which had inflicted these losses on the Kingdom. Many Hungarians, of course, understood by 'revision' the complete restoration of 'historic Hungary'. They had been brought up in an intense pride in their ancient state, with its 'millenary frontiers' and in a firm belief that no other order was right, natural or even, in the long run, possible in the Danube basin. They had been taught to believe that the 'disloyalty' of the non-Magyars was simply the work of a few agitators, fomented from outside—from Rumania, Serbia or the anti-Hungarian forces in Austria. They believed that the peoples them-

[1] The census subsequently taken by all Successor States were, indeed, much less favourable to the Magyar element, but still showed large numbers of Magyars in each of these three States.

THE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY

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from Romania (1890-1916). These imports gradually declined in importance as Austrian (Galician) and, to a lesser degree, Hungarian, crude oil production developed.

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Oil exploration until 1894 was on a small scale and was mainly of a local nature. Since no commercial deposits were discovered, from 1894 to 1907 the government granted small subsidies to encourage further exploration. In 1907 the government began to undertake its own exploration (geological surveying) and Section 6 of the Law of 1911 declared all natural hydrocarbons a state monopoly. Subsequently, numerous concessions were granted to Hungarian as well as foreign companies under this law.

Natural gas, which had found considerable industrial utilization by the end of World War I, was discovered in Transylvania in 1909.

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On the over-all economic scene World War I brought about a great upswing in industrial activities and some controls. During the artificial boom created by the war all basic industries were expanded greatly.

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The Treaty of Trianon, 1920, brought complete separation from Austria; it also brought the loss of more than two-thirds of Hungary's land area and some three-fifths of her population. The Dual Monarchy's tariff-free market of fifty million people was reduced to a market of little more than eight million. The lost territories included all the regions where oil and gas prospecting had taken place. Slovakia and Ruthenia in the north went to Czechoslovakia; Croatia, Bachka, and the Mura district in the south were incorporated into Yugoslavia; while Romania obtained Transylvania and adjacent areas in the east.

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The dislocations caused by the war, by the ensuing disturbances, and by the enormous loss of territory brought the whole Hungarian economy to the verge of chaos.

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In 1924 the government adopted a policy of high tariff protection for industry by which Hungary, like her neighbors, aimed at self-sufficiency.

THE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY

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[434] only 186 were working at over 70 percent of prewar capacity, while 1,109, or over 25 percent, were completely out of operation. It is estimated that even in 1946/47 the national income was only 65 percent that of 1938 and less than 50 percent that of 1943, the peak war year. The Hungarian economy as a whole, and especially the industrial sector, heavily concentrated in Budapest, was among those most seriously damaged in Europe.

[458] The Soviet occupation, heavy reparations payments, general political uncertainty, and a runaway inflation in 1946 made the task of reconstruction even more difficult.

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648 According to the Potsdam agreement all Axis property, even that which had been forcibly taken over by the Germans during the war was handed over to the Soviet Union. Subsequently, new Soviet-Hungarian companies began to mushroom in manufacturing as well as in transportation, and it was at this time that the Hungarian-Soviet Oil Company, Maszovol, was organized.

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[471] While the Zala fields had escaped major war damage they suffered by the wasteful practices engaged in under pressure from German and later Soviet military authorities (see Table VII).[1] After prolonged negotiations the MAORT properties (all areas west of the Danube) were returned to the American owners in 1946.

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471 A land reform and the nationalization of industries "with monopolistic character" such as steel and coal were swiftly carried out after the war.

[565] Land reform, nationalization without compensation, and the inflation of 1946 largely destroyed the propertied classes, and in the chaotic conditions a downward leveling also affected the skilled workers.

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[665] By mid-1947 the communists within the coalition government had virtually eliminated any possibility for non-communist government plans, and for all practical economic purposes the communists were in control. Dictated by the realities of the prevailing postwar conditions, certain

[1] [Cf. page 88, category 116 -- Analyst]

12: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) [illegible] EC1 Hungary EC1

000 desirable by-product of kerosene refining.

382 After 1910, as electric lighting replaced kerosene lamps, automobiles came into use and the diesel engine was invented; and gasoline and heavier motor and lubricating oils joined kerosene as important oil products. Hungarian gasoline consumption remained low, however. To reduce imports it was mixed with alcohol from surplus potatoes. While few homes were oil-heated, industry consumed increasing quantities of oil.

382 433 439 The volume of total crude refined in Hungary was 117,000 tons in 1902, and reached 396,000 tons in 1913, the peak pre-World War I year. Of the total, 90 percent came from Galicia, about 7 percent was imported from Romania, while the remaining 3 percent came from scattered domestic production and other sources.

● [728] After World War I Galicia went to Poland. The oil fields there were partly exhausted and partly destroyed and production decreased considerably. At first imports from the Soviet Union replaced the Galician crude to some extent. Specialized products, especially lubricating oils, were imported from Germany and from the United States. Beginning in 1914 Hungary had refined lubricating oils from the Egbell (Gbely) crude but this field went to Czechoslovakia after the war.

In 1926 an agreement was reached with Romania concerning the import of "synthetic crude," now a gasoline-crude mixture, and from then on until 1940 that country became practically the sole source of Hungarian imports. Total Hungarian imports in 1926 amounted to 61,600 tons of synthetic crude and 73,600 tons of refined products, or a total of 135,200 tons. This was a sharp increase over the previous year and must be contrasted with total imports of only 17,200 tons in 1920 and an average of 67,000 tons for the years 1921-1925. Imports continued to increase and reached their peak in 1936 with 238,300 tons of Romanian synthetic crude and 21,800 tons of refined products from Romania and Germany, a total of 260,100 tons or almost twice the 1926 figure.

15: Kárpáti G-3 (no date) 1943 EC1 Hungary EC1

I.

FROM TRIANON TO SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

728 After the first world war no other country was reduced to such economic and financial straits as Hungary. She not only lost the greater and more valuable part of her territory, but a considerable proportion of her population as well. Furthermore, her economic unity was disorganized and her natural resources passed into foreign hands. The social and economic structure of the country was basically changed almost overnight, and that fact in itself forced the Government to battle with problems which were practically unknown in other countries. At the same time the social claims to a better standard of living by the great masses were on the increase in Hungary too. So, all told, the maintenance and the preservation of social equilibrium and that of undisturbed production demanded far more zealous efforts from her statesmen than in any other country in Europe.

728 Formerly Hungary was an agricultural country form-
433 ing a well-balanced economic unit on the way to industrialization. The changes brought about by the Treaty of Trianon meant a reversion in this respect to more primi-
000 tive conditions. This trend was aggravated by the fact

161 This trend ? was aggravated by the fact
458 that Hungary was such a densely populated state. The
241 density of her population amounted to almost 100 people per square kilometre. Due to the low agricultural prices prevailing generally in the world, to the keen foreign competition and to her dependence upon the exportation of raw products it was almost impossible adequately to maintain the agrarian population by the cultivation of the soil.

728 While her old Austro-Hungarian market of 58 million
439 people was reduced to a market of 7·5 million, she was
652 burdened in addition with large foreign debts which could only be paid by agricultural exports. Owing to political considerations, the surrounding countries, instead of absorbing the Hungarian surplus products, boycotted her during the early post-war years. Added to this, the economic and other restrictions of the peace treaty made it impossible for Hungary to pursue an independent economic policy serving the true needs of the country. Not until eight years after the end of the first world war was the Government able to introduce an economic policy (industrialization, protective tariff system etc.) which could meet the challenge of the density of population and prevailing unemployment.

728 The difficulties of the post-war years were aggravated
464 by the existence within her borders of hundreds of thousands of refugees from former Hungarian territory. Our educated classes had grown numerically so great that it was practically impossible to find places for everyone in
652 the administration and economic systems. Millions had
185 to be spent on measures serving solely charitable purposes out of the proceeds of production and out of greatly decreased state receipts, which fell off as a result of the effects of the war. Therefore, for the first few years, no

? [i.e., a reversion to more primitive conditions -- Analyst]

planned social policy of bolder conception and projecting into the future could be instituted.

Social progress was obstructed also by other difficulties. The Government of Hungary consistently endeavoured to raise the living standards of the people. Several circumstances, beyond the control of political leadership, occasionally thwarted such efforts. When the period marked by the aforementioned economic boycott came to an end, several waves of depression swept over Europe, and by these Hungary was always seriously affected.

The liquidation of the post-war inflation was done under the financial supervision of the League of Nations, which meant that we did not enjoy full financial sovereignty. The same thing took place a second time after 1931 when the Central European economic and financial credit crisis occasioned new control. In spite of the exceptionally adverse conditions Hungary did not halt on her way to social advancement, but from the beginning the interests of social welfare constituted the key-note of her efforts to harmonize her economic and political life. In the enactment of all laws in the economic and financial sphere, social problems were given foremost consideration at all times during the past twenty years.

The march of social advancement was retarded at intervals by the world-wide depression, and therefore social conditions in Hungary could not progress all along the line as rapidly as was desired by the Government. Nevertheless the achievements have been great. In several respects, as we shall see, the social reforms were far in advance of those undertaken by larger and more wealthy nations, while again they can be considered as trail-blazers in some of their implications.

1/7 [cf., category 116, p.8 --- Analyst]

II. GENERAL SOCIAL POLICY.

Problems of the Civil Service.

The most pressing problem to be met during the critical situation brought about by the Treaty of Trianon was that dealing with the distressing plight of the educated classes. Countless obstacles hindered the employment of educated youths. Since the country had to be reorganized after the first world war and the ensuing communist revolution, the problems of the civil servants occupied a prominent position and had to be dealt with regardless of the almost insurmountable difficulties.

Since 1918 the salaries of the civil servants have been raised several times when compatible with the national budget. Social considerations played a prominent part in this respect in so far as the ratio of increases in the lower brackets was higher than in the upper ones. Again, when conditions necessitated salary cuts, those in the lower brackets were given similar proportionate consideration. It is worthy of note that the interests of family protection were always given foremost consideration, and the adjustment of family allowances was always on a progressive basis.

This policy has the following result; while a civil servant in the fifth grade receives not quite 70% of his 1918 salary, those in the eleventh grade receive 110%, and some messengers 140%. The family allowance of a civil servant in the eleventh grade was 10% of his salary for his wife and each child. Now he receives allowances on the following scale: 30% of his salary for his wife, 30% for his first child, 30% for his second, 35% for his third, 42% for his fourth, and 50% for his fifth child.

camps and by supplying clothing and shoes to the needy members. As all young men are members it is the most wide-spread organization in the country both from a national defence and social welfare standpoint.

III. AGRARIAN SOCIAL POLICY.

In the first decade following the Treaty of Trianon social conditions in the rural districts deteriorated in consequence of the changed economic structure of the country, which was aggravated by the following conditions. The supply of labourers far exceeded the demands made by diversified farming, the apportionment of the land in certain districts was very unequal, the distribution of the rural population varied greatly and the ranks of the rural proletariat were enormously increased.

Fifty-two per cent. of the Hungarian population is engaged in farming. Two thirds of this number (3 million including their families), were farm labourers and small farmers who had to supplement their meagre incomes by working for wages on larger farms. The density of the rural population was 59 persons per square kilometre, twice as much as the density of the Danish and French rural population and decidedly more than that of Germany. It goes without saying that the density of the agrarian population in Eastern Europe is much less than in Hungary.

In a less accentuated form the agrarian problems of present-day Hungary are the same, since the re-occupation of former Hungarian territories hardly altered the situation. The land reforms carried out by the Succession

States during the past twenty years aggravated rather than improved the position of the Hungarian agrarian elements in their midst.

The density of the rural population and the ratio of the farmers to the rest of the community proves definitely that this fundamental social problem cannot be solved merely by dividing up the land. Nevertheless important steps have been taken in Hungary in favour of dividing the land more equally, and these on the whole were more far reaching than in the surrounding states. Under the land reform of 1920 more than one million Hungarian acres of arable land were distributed, and in connection with this reform 260,000 building lots were made available for the needy rural population. In 1936, 1940 and in 1941 other land reform measures were introduced in Parliament. Up to 1942 the following figures illustrated the division of the land :

Through state activities in this field 1,400,173 Hungarian acres (about 1,950,000 English acres) and 456,757 acres through subdivision by private concerns were distributed. In the course of the land reform of 1920, 1,045,628 Hungarian acres, and the Land Settlement Act of 1936 354,487 Hungarian acres were allotted. The almost 2 million acres divided up equals 67·5% of the estates of over 1000 acres in private hands, and is considerably more than all the arable land of these estates.

The number of the small farms in Hungary is constantly and rapidly increasing and this process has not been stopped but is being stimulated by intensified political activity. In 1935 the distribution of arable land according to the size of the farms compared with Germany and Italy was as follows :

20: Gyorgy S-4 (no date)1947 EC1 Hungary EC1

interested observers, particularly as the shaky foundations of the coalition government, built on a tenuous layer of last minute political compromises, collapsed almost immediately under their own weight.

In January and February 1947 several hundred persons were suddenly arrested by the police. The Communist Ministry of the Interior claimed that a large-scale and secret conspiracy was under way with the object of restoring the rule of Nicholas Horthy who fled the country in October 1944. The conspirators were accused of wanting to establish their own government, drawing largely on personnel associated with Horthy's regime. To achieve this it was stated, they organized the secret *Magyar Közösség* (Hungarian Unity Society) which was controlled by two small groups of the counterrevolutionary elite, a political Committee of Seven and a military Commission of Six. The discovery of this conspiracy and the ensuing purge were carefully timed so as to remove certain potentially dangerous anti-Communist elements before the Soviet Army would have to leave the country.[20]

The purge of "reactionary plotters" was directed against two definite groups in Hungary's public life, the Army and the Smallholders Party. It first intended to remove a few high-ranking Army leaders in order to streamline the remaining meager armed forces of the country. The Army would thus be re-screened into a highly reliable political force under the leadership of such extreme Communists as General Pálffy who has been the real power in the Ministry of War ever since the first reorganization by the coalition government. It is interesting to note that among the first few persons arrested in this "rightist-reactionary conspiracy against the state"[21] were many of the chief protagonists of the Hungarian-Soviet armistice negotiations of 1944-1945, men who spent several months in Moscow preparatory to the final surrender. General Vörös, Faraghó and Almássy were leaders of this group, and their arrests were carried out by the Communist controlled Political Department of the War Ministry, an organization which played a notorious

20 According to the terms of the peace treaty, ninety days after ratification all Soviet troops except for a few units guarding the lines of communication between Russia and Austria must be withdrawn from Hungary.

21 Cf. *Szabad Szó*, organ of the National Peasant Party, Jan. 16, 1947, and *Világ*, Jan. 18, 1947. News of a "fascist" conspiracy quickly spread abroad where it caused immediate speculations concerning the future destinies of Hungary, involving the inevitability of a Communist dictatorship. Cf. "Die Verhaftungen in Budapest," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Jan. 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1947; "Hungarian Arrests, Alleged Foreign Aid to Conspirators," *The Manchester Guardian*, Jan. 18, 1947; "Hungarian General Flees, and Hungarian Communist Demands," *The Times*, London, Jan. 14, 1947; C. M. Rodney, "The Hungarian Conspiracy," *The Central European Observer*, Jan. 24, 1947.

20: Gyorgy S-4 (no date)1947 EC1 Hungary EC1

selected from all major labor unions is headed by an ardent Communist, Kossa, organizer of the Budapest streetcar workers union.

An essential institution in Hungarian industry is the factory committee, elected by the workers to represent their interests in dealing with the management, or with State officials now serving as replacements for an almost extinct managerial class. These small factory committees are particularly sensitive to party ideology and are permeated by Communist propaganda. Through them the workers are brought into constant contact with political authorities of the State, and their private life is closely watched. At their trade union meetings they are given lectures on foreign and domestic politics devoted frequently to violent hate propaganda against Britain and the United States.[43] Trade unions and factory committees have thus become important tools in the hands of the country's dominant political-economic bloc.

The process of industrial recovery and the strengthening of a new laboring class have suffered considerably by the recent financial disaster which culminated in the inflation of 1946. The country's economic foundations were first weakened by the wave of German looting and seizures of valuable assets and capital goods, estimated at approximately ten billion dollars. The economic deathblow was then delivered by the prompt acquisitiveness with which Soviet Russia reduced occupied Hungary to the role of an economic colony. The threatening upward spiral of prices, wages and nominal money values finally drove out the Pengö, discredited by a long and unchecked period of inflation. The economic situation improved substantially after the stabilization of August 1946 when an old Austro-Hungarian monetary unit, the *forint* (florin), had been established as the fixed national currency. By the end of 1946 industrial capacity was gradually restored to about sixty percent of the pre-war potential, although Hungary continued to pay an exceedingly heavy reparation bill, both in industrial equipment and in current manufacturing production.[44]

Reparations today include nearly all of the country's capital goods

43 Cf. "Workers and Industry, Danubian Outlook," *The Economist*, Jan. 25, 1947, p. 134.

44 N. Káldor estimates that at least one-fourth of the total current production goes to the U.S.S.R. The reparations burden is further enhanced by a strict interpretation of the Potsdam agreement according to which the Russians continue to compute the reparations bill in "dollars of 1938 purchasing power." Nevertheless, Professor Káldor reaches the strange conclusion that "the picture of Soviet Russia as the ruthless economic exploiter of Hungary is far too one-sided." Cf. "The Danubian States," *The Times*, London, Nov. 19, 1946.

20: Gyorgy S-4 (no date)1947 EC1 Hungary EC1

728 Reparations today include nearly all of the country's capital goods
648 production, and through the device of "joint economic collaboration" agreements Soviet control has penetrated all major phases of the economic structure. Particularly farreaching are the agreements in oil and bauxite production, in Danube shipping and in civil aviation. Capital and management are as tightly controlled as if these economic activities had been actually nationalized by the government.[45] Soviet occupational authorities also acquired majority holdings in banks, insurance companies, mining corporations and in most of the remaining non-socialized factories.

Summary

727 Hungary today is in the twilight zone of liberated states; her domestic politics are a mirror-like reflection of the fundamental tensions among the world powers. The post-war era has undoubtedly seen hopes for a real moral and economic transformation of the country spurred on by a series of significant, if temporary, liberal reform moves. Fair national elections resulting in a decisive Communist defeat and in an acceptable coalition government based on the Smallholders, a national party neither ultra-conservative nor revolutionary,[46] a thorough land reform, a reasonably free press, a stabilized currency, and a moderately successful process of industrial nationalization were promising landmarks at the beginning of the road toward reconstruction.

727 Yet the forces responsible for these significant results were *swiftly*
669 *destroyed by the rising influence of the Communist Party which brought internal disruption and social crisis.* The triumphs of liberation were obscured by an oppressive and prolonged military occupation, and the coalition government gave way to Communist domination which reduced all other parties to silent and non-active partners. The land reform generated conflicts between Church and State as well as between the ex-gentry whose estates were expropriated and new peasant-landholders who now had property but no equipment. The newly won freedom of the press gradually disappeared as the political balance of power shifted and one party emerged as the final arbiter. The swift

45 Elaborate executive decrees were issued to give adequate legal basis to these joint agreements and to earmark the use of most industrial production for reparations. The first four decrees were issued in July, 1946 and consist of the statutes of the Hungarian-Soviet Shipping Company, the Masovol Hungarian-Soviet Crude Oil Company, the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Company and the Danubian Alumina Industry.

46 There was a considerable counter-revolutionary vote in the conservative victory of November, 1945, observes Oscar Jászi, but "it should not be forgotten that the Smallholders Party is not reactionary, nor even conservative, it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms." "The Choices in Hungary," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1946, p. 462.

old career officers and from the Communist politicians, except perhaps in the very top post or posts.

In August 1950 Soviet military regulations were made compulsory in the Hungarian Army. At that time Nogradi explained in a speech that this action would inject "a new warrior spirit" into the army. "Having learned Stalinist strategy and tactics, our armed forces will be ready to fight and to win."[38]

The new army did not long stay within the confines of the treaty of peace. According to Article 12 of the treaty, the armed forces were to consist of no more than 65,000 men. In December 1950 Marshal Tito estimated them at 165,000, and in July of 1951 Dedijer estimated them at 200,000.[39] They were already three times as numerous as permitted in the treaty. The build-up continued, however. The 1951 military expenditures were estimated to exceed those of 1949 and 1950 combined and to be ten times as great as those in 1948. Roads, railways, and air fields were built. Indeed even in the period since the death of Stalin the Hungarians announced a new and expanded build-up of their armed forces.

This expansion under Farkas was accompanied by accelerated purges. According to a speech which Farkas delivered in March 1951 the number of new officers in the Hungarian Army staff rose from 5.5 percent in January 1949 to 80.7 percent in January 1951. The new officers, he said, included 38.1 percent industrial workers, 20.5 percent agricultural workers, 13.5 percent peasants, 7.4 percent artisans and merchants, and 20.5 percent intellectuals.[40] The rapid increase in new officers meant both that old officers had been purged and that the number of officers had grown greatly. The two years after Farkas took over were years of the most rapid and profound change.

By 1953 the Hungarian Army had been transformed into a politically-acceptable force but its highly political leadership no longer met the needs for technical competence and had done its own job so well that it could be replaced. General Bata then took over.

It is, of course, difficult to get valid information on the new military structure. In 1950 the organization and administrative structure of the Ministry of Defense and of military offices became a secret even to the staff themselves. Organizational charts are no longer posted in the offices and name plates rarely appear on doors. Jurisdiction and spheres of activity are no longer clearly and publicly defined and amendments to the defense act are not published. In this respect, of course, Hungary is simply following the standard Iron Curtain pattern.

We have, however, for Hungary one set of data which we do not have for any of the other satellites and which tells us a little about the program for training a new officer corps composed of people who are both professionally qualified and politically loyal. For Hungary we have a small sample of biographies of colonels. Because they are